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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BARBARA Mc"TILLIAl\IS, et al.,

'

Plaintiffs and Appellants, )

'

vs.

' Case No.
( 11043
\
'

OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY,
a corporation, and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants and Respondents. f

DEFENDAl'J"T'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sterling C. Mc"Tilliams filed an application for
hearing to settle an industrial claim on November 23,
1964. In this application he claimed compensation for
a basal skull fracture (R. 4). The defendants denied
liability. Subsequent to said denial the parties entered
into a stipulation and left to the Industrial Commission
the determination of the question whether or not, at the

1

time of the accident, that occurred on July 22 1964
'
'
Mr. l\Ic\Villiams was an employee or an independent
contractor. An order was entered by the Industrial
Commission dated December 17, 1964 (R. 18 and 19)
wherein the Industrial Commission stated as follows:
"One issue to be resol ,·ed is the relationship
between applicant and the defendant, namely,
was the applicant an employer or a subcontract or.l''
The Commission found that ou July 2~, 1964 Mr. Mc"\Villiams was an employee of the defendant, Olympia
Sales Company. The Commission held that the applicant's injuries sustained on that date arose out of and
in the course of his employment, and further required
i.he defendants to "pay all medical and hospital bills
incurred as a result of the accidental injury." The order
left open the question of permanent disability of the
applicant ( R. 19) .
This order of December 17, 1964 did not determine the extent of injury nor did it set forth a basis
that the applicants in this case, Barbara Mc"\Villiams,
et al., were entitled to death benefits. This point was
made clear by the Industrial Commission in its order
dated September 23, 1965 ( R. 93) wherein the Industrial Commission held as follo-ws:
"The Commission order of December 17,
1964 does not determine that the death of Sterling l\ic"\Villiams on March 9, 1965 was caused
by -the injury of July 22, 19G4."
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After the order of December 17, 1964, Sterling
McV\Tilliams, on January 14, 1965, requested a change
of doctors, asking for permission to see a chiropractor
(R. 21). Dr. llirdsley, a chiropractor, reported on
January 22, 1965 that Mr. Mc Williams had received
four adjustments and that progress to that date was
normal. He commented further that Mr. McWilliams
'\vas elated" because of the favorable progress that he
had noted in his condition ( R. 24) .
The record indicates that the Industrial Commission's and the defendants' first knowledge of difficulties relating to a heart condition was Dr. Evans' report
(R. 20, 25, 26 and 27) which was dated and received
in January 1965.
On February 25, 1965, Mr. Mc\Villiams was examined at the request of the defendant, the State Insurance ]'und, by Dr. L. E. Viko. Dr. Viko, in his
report to the Insurance Fund, noted that he examined
Mr. MdVilliams on February 25, 1965, and based upon
this examination and after discussion with his treating
physician Dr. Evans, Mr. McWilliams left for the
hospital promptly for the insertion of a cardiac pacemaker (R. 36). The pacemaker was surgically implanted on February 26, 1965, by Dr. Russell M. N elson and the day subsequent to his discharge from the
hospital on March 3, 1965, he died at his home.
On the 15th day of March, 1965, the applicants,
Barbara McWilliams and her children through their
attorney, filed an application to settle an industrial
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accident, claiming death benefits, alleging that the basal
skull fracture which occurred ou July 22, 1964 caused
the <lea th of Mc \V illiams ( R. 42) .
The defendants denied any liability for the death
of .Mr. Mc\Villiams and stated, "This case involves
medical questions and so we respectfully suggest that
it be ref erred to a medical panel." ( R. 55) The Industrial Commission appointed a medical panel pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-77 U.C.A. 1953, as
amended ( R. 59) .
The record is clear that both the applicant Barbara l\!IcVVilliams and her attorney received notice of
the appointment of the medical panel (R. 59). The
letter of appointment was directed to Dr. L. E. Viko
asking him to serve along with Dr. Crockett and Dr.
Kilpatrick. No objection was raised by the applicant
to the appointment of Dr. Viko. The panel filed its
report on July 22, 1965. It was specifically stated in
this panel report that the file of Dr. Viko's examination
of February 25, 1965 was attached and circulated to
the members of the panel ( R. 73) . The panel report
found that the cause of death was due to a cardiac failure and was brought about by ventricular fibrillation
occurring in spite of the pacemaker. The panel report
discussed the possibility of whether or not Mr. MdVilliams 'exposure to lacquer fumes on July 22, 1964 and
the fall contributed to the death: and, concluded that
it had not. In reviewing this problem the doctors turned
to experts who had studied the effects of exposure to
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fumes of this nature. In addition, the U. S. Public
Service Department was contacted in regards to their
conclusions in this matter. All of these reports were
made a part of the industrial file. It was the opinion
of the panel that there was no association between the
lacquer exposure and the heart disease that caused the
death of Mr. McWilliams.
Pursuant to the procedure of the Industrial Commission, copies of the medical panel report were circulated to all concerned parties. The applicants, within
the statutory time, objected to the report of the medical
panel on numerous grounds and for numerous reasons.
At this point no objections were filed by the applicant
to the appointment of Dr. Viko by the Industrial Commission to the panel and to the procedure used by the
panel in arriving at its conclusions ( R. 83, 84 and 85).
Subsequent to objecting to the medical panel report, the applicants filed a Motion asserting that the
December 17, 1964 order was "res ajudicata" and that
the applicants were entitled to death benefits. The
Commission, in response to this motion, denied the
same and stated that the December 17, 1964 order did
not determine the issue of the cause of Mr. Mc,Villiams'
death and set a hearing based upon the applicants'
objections to the medical panel report (R. 93). After
this matter had been continued at the convenience of
applicant and not until the matter was set for hearing
did the applicant raise the issue that the medical panel
report was objected to on the grounds that Dr. Yiko
had sat on the same (R. 99).
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Prior to the hearing on the objections to th
report, the applicant took the depositions of D
ton and Dr. David, who reside in Boise, Idah
applicants' brief on file herein quotes at lengt
the depositions of these doctors. In summary, D
ton, who is a specialist in orthopedic surgery, co1
that ~fr. Mc,Villiams' death was due to the f:
occurred on July 22, 196-J.. Dr. David, who is a
practitioner at Boise, Idaho, testified that in his
l\'Ir. l\Ic\Villiams' death was due to the injury r
on July 22, 1964. Dr. David felt that both the j
the exposure to the lacquer fumes concurrently l
about the death of Mr. Mc,Villiams.

Subsequent to the taking of these deposi1
hearing was held on the objections to the medical
report heretofore filed when Dr. Viko was sit
chairman. Prior to this time Dr. Viko had di
Dr. Kilpatrick appeared on behalf of the pane
l~ilpatrick testified that in his opinion there was
nection between the lacquer exposure and the 1
heart disease that the deceased had in this paJ
case. He testified that in his opinion there ,
connection between the fall that Mr. Mc'-"
had experienced and the resulting problems of hi:
He further testified that the combination of l
these factors ·did not contribute to the death (J
266).

The applicant at this time introduced into ei
testimony from friends and relatives of Mr. 1'
Iiams that described his fainting subsequent to 1
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and his prior good health. Also, testimony was iniroduced by a chiropractor in the form of a written report
as to his findings prior to the death of Mr. Mc,Villiams.
Dr. Kilpatrick had an opportunity to sit through the
entire hearing and was recalled as the last witness. He
was asked specifically whether or not the testimony
tendered, in any manner, varied his opinion as to the
cause of Mr. McWilliams' death. The Doctor testified
that in his opinion no additional facts had been added
which would alter his conclusions and opinions ( R.
312, 313).

After this hearing the Industrial Commission felt
it appropriate to appoint another medical panel. .Forwarded to the new panel was all factual information
presented by the applicants including all medical reports (such as the treating chiropractor's) and the depositions of Dr. Burton and Dr. David. This panel was
appointed pursuant to a letter of August 3, 1966. No
objections were registered by either party to this procedure.
35-1-77 refers to 35-2-56 U.C.A. 1953, as amended,

in setting forth the qualifications of the doctors that
serve on the medical panel. It states that the appointment should be made of not less than three physicians
specializing in the treatment of the disease or the condition involved in the case. In this particular case the
second medical panel consisted of six specialists.
This panel filed its report on October 12, 1966.
The medical panel report, in essence, found that:
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"It is highly probable that Mr. McWilliams
had organic heart disease involving the conductive system of the heart which ante-dated his fall
and alleged accident and which was responsible
for the fall and the subsequent progression of the
heart disease leading to his death. Further, the
panel finds no evidence that the inhalation of
lacquer fumes, as alleged, was responsible for
the heart disease or its consequences." (R. 35)

It was the opinion of this panel,
"that it is highly probable that Mr. McWilliams had organic heart disease which ante-dated
his fall and injury of July 22, 1964, and, that
it was the natural progression of the pre-existing
heart disease which led to his eventual death on
March 4, 1965." (R. 347)

It should be noted that the panel took into consideration the testimony tendered by the applicants'
doctors, Dr. Burton and Dr. David. The applicant
objected to the report of the medical panel and pursuant to said objections a hearing was held on March I,
1967 in which Dr. Orme, one of the members of the
panel, was present.
The applicant on cross-examination of Dr. Orme
extensively questioned him concerning the panel's reliance on statements made in hospital records in regards
to evidence of dizzy spells, claiming that this evi<lencc
Y•:as mere hearsay. The doctor, however, testified that
such evidence had no real effect in the ultimate conclusion.
8

"Q In other words, your opinions would be
the same if there was no evidence .at all that
he had ever had any dizzy spells?

A Yes sir." (R. 377)
The Industrial Commission filed Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Award on August 14, 1967,
finding that the applicants were not entitled to receive
death benefits by reason of the accident that occurred
to Mr. Mc,:Villiams on July 22, 1964.
POINT I
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID
NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY BENEFITS BY REASON OF THE ACCIDENT TO
MR. McWILLIAMS ON JULY 22, 1964.
The applicant in her first sentence in her brief
under Point I properly states the issue to be decided
by this Court when she states as follows:
"The principle we contend is the controlling
factual issue in this case is whether or not the
heart malfunction of McWilliams was directly
related to or caused by the fall McWilliams
received on July 22, 1964, it having been previously determined that Mc Williams was acting
in the course and scope of his employment with
the defendant Olympia Sales Company at the
time of the fall".
The applicant quotes in her brief the first medical panel
report (R. 73) in part and infers that the panel con-
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sidere<l only two possibilities as a cause for the cardiac
death. She then urges that by finding that the death
was caused by a pre-existing condition as opposed to
the circumstances surrounding the accident of July 22,
1964 that the findings of the panel were entirely negative. The position of the applicant, in essence, is that
this Court should believe the applicant's experts as
opposed t~ the panel's conclusions. The Hearing Examiner in this case noted the discrepancy in opinions of
the physicians that had testified and stated as follows:
"The hearing examiner is more persuaded on
the disputed medical facts by the expressed
opinion of the medical panels which consisted
of a total of seven internists and cardiologists
and one neurologist. The evidence of the applicant came from a general practitioner and an
orthopedic surgeon. I am not persuaded necessarily by numbers, but the qualifications of the
Commission's special medical p_anel are undisputed, and their conclusions must not be disregarded." (R. 386).
The record in this case consists primarily of examination and cross examination of medical witnesses. It
is interesting to note that the appellant in urging this
Court to disregard the panel's conclusions and adopt
the opinion of her experts fails t o note that even
her experts disagree as to the cause of death in this
matter. On cross examination, Dr. Burton testified as
follows:
"Q Dr. Burton, I want to be sure I understand your testimony. Is it not your position that
the ca~se of the death of Mr. Mc,Villiams was
IO

caused--! am not talking about causal connection, which came first, the egg or the chicken! am talking about caused by the fall rather
than a contribution of the exposure of lacquer
fumes and the fall?
"A No. I feel that the lacquer fumes caused
that original attack of syncope which caused the
call and the sequence from there on is all in the
record.
"Q Therefore, you do not feel that the exposure to the lacquer fumes directly affected
the heart?
"A Except on a temporary basis, no.
"Q And had no appreciable lasting effect as
far as what progressed later when talking about
directly affecting the heart?

"A No, I don't feel so-possible but to me
not very probable.
"Q Then you agree with or disagree with Mr.
David?

"A I probably do.
"Q You were here when he gave his testimony
or the greater majority of it?

"A Yes.
"Q And you did understand that his position
was that there were dual factors that is the direct
and causal connection of the inhaling of the
fumes of the lacquer which directly contributed
to the disease of the heart along with the fall.
Was that not his position?
"A I believe so.
"Q And you disagree with that?
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"A Yes, pathologically there is no evidence
of heart disease. It is a functional disease he died
from rather than anything else." (R. 155, 156)
The issue presented in this appeal is not whether
or not this Court should examine the voluminous medical records and testimony and decide whether or not to
believe the applicants' experts as opposed to the medical panel's conclusions, but rather whether or not the
Commission's holdings and order in this case is such, that
the Commission's action can be said to be arbitrary and
capricious. This Court has on many occasions been
faced with the problem that is presented by appellants'
theory in urging this Court to chose between the opinions
of experts at an industrial hearing and to overturn the
Industrial Commission's findings. It is agreed that
plaintiff's doctors felt there was a connection between
the injury arising out of the accident of July 22nd and
the resulting death of Mr. :Mc,Villiams. There is no
doubt, however, that there was contrary medical testimony that the death of Mr. ~IdVilliams was not so
related but was rather due to a pre-existing condition.
This Court has pointed out in Vause v. Industrial
Commission, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P. 2d 1006, that our
"statutory and decisional law require us to look at the
cYidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's
finding and it is the obligation of the parties involved
to so present the matter to the Court."
It is respectfully submitted that the applicant in
this case in· quoting at length from her doctors' testi-
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mony is rearguing a factual question that has been <letermined by the Commission and has set no basis for
this Court to find that the Commission acted arbitrary
and capricious.
It is fundamental that the findings of the Industrial Commission on conflicting medical testimony cannot be disturbed on appeal. As early as 1924 this Court
in Campbell v. Eagle and Blue Bell Mining Compan.11,
64 Utah 430, 231 Pac. 620, articulated the rule in cases
of this kind and the Court stated as fallows:

"The testimony taken before the Commission
consists entirely of the opinions of medical experts with the exception of the testimony of the
applicant, Campbell. This testimony is conflicting. \Ve can see nothing in this record for
review except the findings of the Commission
based upon conflicting testimony. The testimony
was competent and material to the issues to be
determined by the Commission, and on that
testimony the Commission made its findings.
This court, in proceedings of this character, is
without power to disturb the findings of the
Commission based upon competent conflicting
testimony. The statute so provides, and the court
has so decided in numerous opinions. It is wholly
immaterial that this court, or the individual
members thereof, might have come to a different
conclusion than that reached by the Commission.
The Commission's findings are binding when
supported by competent, material testimony."
Also see Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah
381, 57 P. 2d 724 and Kavalinakis v. Industrial Cornmi8sion, 67 Utah 174, 246 Pac. 698.
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A rather recent Utah case facing the issue of a preexisting condition as being the cause for the disability
as versus an accident is 1 1hompson v. Industrial Com,mU,·sion, 19 Utah 2d 129, 427 P. ~d 394. That case presented a fact situation where the Industrial Commission
adopted the medical panel report. The medical panel
report stated that there was "no good evidence that the
alleged injury on or about July 17, 1964 had any relationship ... " with the accident in question. The applicant in that case attacked the Commission's order on
appeal in essence on the same grounds that the appellant is now urging on this Court. For example, the
applicant argues on page 7 of her brief that there was
"no evidence" of heart disease which pre-existed the fall
and further they argue that the autopsy does not corroborate the theory that there was a pre-existing condition. The doctors in sustaining the medical panel
report recognize this fact and have repeatedly pointed
out the same in both their reports and testimony and
notwithstanding this lack of evidence find in their
opinion that there is no connection between the accident
in question and the resulting cardiac death. On page
30 of her brief the appellant urges that the testimony
of the plaintiffs' doctors as versus the panel's doctors
should be believed because one may relate "common
sense and experience with life." As stated earlier, this
was the same argument that was made by the applicant
in Thompson v. Industrial Commission, supra. The
court, however, held as follows:
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"It appears that the Commission based its
decision upon the conflicting medical opinions.
We must conclude that the order was based upon
competent evidence. There is nothing in the
record to in di ca te that the Commission acted
capriciously or arbitrarily".

Citing Carnpbell v. Eayle and Blue Bell 1lfining Company, supra.
As mentioned earlier, the panel fully recognized
that there was no objective evidence in regard to a preexisting condition. In regard to this issue, however, the
panel stated as follows :
"The panel reviewed and discussed, with interest, the information in the file concerning the
possible causal relationship between the inhalation of the lacquer fumes and Mr. McWilliams'
fall and head injury and the possible relationship
of these events to his heart block and subsequent
death . . .
"The panel recognizes and notes the fact that
the file contains statements of several individuals
which attest to Mr. WcWilliams excellent health
and lack of symptoms related to his heart or
nervous system prior to his alleged accident.
Moreover, the panel recognizes that the previous
medical panel and the pathologist who performed
the autopsy on Mr. McWilliams found no evidence of significant organic disease of the heart
or nervous system prior to the insertion of the
electrical pace making device. The panel agrees
with other opinions contained in the file that it
is regrettable th~t no detailed i?f.ormation ~eems
to exist concernmg Mr. Mc W 1lhams cardiac or
nenous system status prior to July 22, 1964.
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In spite of the above considerations, it is the
opinion of the present panel that it is highly
probable that Mr. Mc\Villiams had organic
heart disease which ante-dated his fall and injury
on July 22, 1964, and, that it is the natural progress of the pre-existing heart disease which led
to his eventual death on March 4, 1965."
The argument used by plaintiffs in this case was
also urged upon this Court in a recent decision entitled
Mellen v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 431
Pac. 2d 798, in which this Court sustained the Commission's order in adopting the medical panel report. In
the Mellen case the appellant complained that the medical panel was using an improper criteria and was failing
to examine other evidence and as such the award of
the Commission should be reversed. The court held that
the Commission did not err in adopting the panel report
and cited Garner v. Hecla Mining Company, 19 Utah
2d 367, 431 P. 2d 794, which held:
"The insuperable difficulty in plaintiff's attack
on the Commission's finding is that they improperly attempt to focus consideration of the
issues exclusively upon their own view of the
evidence and theories of the case. While some
aspects of the statistical data and medical theories harmonized with their contention, others
failed to do so ... Consistent with the foregoing
and corroborating the existence of unknown
factors and uncertainty as to causation, is the
report of the medical panel to which this case
was referred for examination: 'We cannot confirm that the lung carcinoma was caused by
exposure to uranium mining occupation.' There
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is thus a reasonable basis in the evidence for the
refusal of the Commission to find in accordance
""'.ith the plaintiff's contention. Upon the principles stated above it is our duty to affirm the
decision."
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the
appellant in this case is asking this Court to discount
the two medical panels that were heretofore appointed
and to adopt the testimony tendered on behalf of the
applicant. As stated above, the doctors supporting the
medical panel's report conclude that Mr. MdVilliams'
death was not due to the accident in July 1964, but
rather was due to a pre-existing condition. Certainly,
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the refusal
of the Commission to find in accordance with the plaintiff's contention.

POINT II
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER CANNOT
BE OVERTURNED ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE COMMISSION FAILED TO SUBMIT THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE
CASE TO AN IMPARTIAL MEDICAL PANEL.
There is no doubt that Dr. L. E. Viko, Chairman
of the first medical panel, examined the applicant Sterling Mc\Villiams for the defendant, the State Insurance
Fund. It should be noted, however, that the objection,
that Dr. Viko should not have been a member of the
medical panel, was not raised by the applicant timely.
The record is clear that prior to Dr. Yiko's sitting on
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the first medical panel, llarbara Mc\'Villiams and her
attorney received notice of the appointment of the
medical panel and the fact that Dr. Viko was going to
sit as chairman (R. 59). There was no objection raised
at this time by the applicant to the appointment of Dr.
Yiko. The panel report clearly showed that Dr. Yiko
had examined the patient and that his findings were
contained as part of the industrial report (R. 73). After
the panel report was filed, the applicant objected to the
medical panel. However, she did not object to the fact
that Dr. Viko sat as chairman on said panel (R. 83, 8.J.
and 85). lt was not until after the matter had been set
for hearing, based upon the objections, did the applicant raise the issue that the medical panel report was
void for the reason that Dr. Yiko had sat on said panel
(R. 99). The first notice therefore that the applicant
disagreed to this matter was after the time set for the
hearing on the objections.
Even assuming that the applicant had not waived
her right to this objection by waiting until after the
results of the panel decision were made, it appears that
the point is academic. After this objection was raised
a new medical panel was appointed. No objection was
made to the appointment of the new medical panel nor
the information that was contained in the file that they
were to consider. Therefore, even assuming that the
Commission did not act wisely in allowing Dr. Yiko to
sit on the medical panel, certainly the appointment of
a new and impartial medical panel would correct this
error, if there was one.
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POINT III
THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ESTOPPED .FROM DENYING LIABILITY FOll
APPLICANT'S DEATH BENEFITS.
Plaintiffs' introductory sentence in her brief under
Point III is not accurate. Plaintiff states "After Decedent's initial treatment by Dr. Karowites (sic) on
July 22, 1964 all medical examinations and treatment
was performed and administered by physicians authorized and compensated by the employer's surety, Stale
Insurance Fund." The only evidence in regard to th~
question of authorization and compensation was the
testimony taken on July 6, 1966 when counsel for the
plaintiffs called Mr. Kirkham, Chief Claims Adjuster
for the State Insurance Fund. This witness made it
clear (R. 306) that the defendant, the State Insurance
Fund, did not authorize any treatment for the decedent
in this case. Further, the defendants did not compen··
sate Dr. Evans, the decedent's doctor (R. 310, 311,
317). Mr. Kirkham did explain that if a claimant is
desirous of changing doctors after the initial treatment,
then the authority must be receiYed by the Industrial
Commission, not the State Insurance Fund. The premise, therefore, for plaintiff's argument that all medical
examination and treatment was authorized and compensated by the employer's surety, the State Insurance
Fund, is not true and, in fact, this assertion is contrary
to the evidence.
The plaintiff in her second paragraph under Point
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111 seems to indicate that the defendant, the State Insurance Fund, had notice of the decedent's heart conclitio11 prior to December 7, 1964<. The record is clear,
however, that the first notice of any difficulty in regard
to heart disease was the surgeon's report which was filed
January 8, 1965. This was some time after the stipulation in regard to the issue, of whether or not lVIr . .McWilliams was an employee, was submitted to the Commission and almost a month after the Commission had
set forth its Order of December 17, 1964. The first
formal report from Dr. Evans as to the type of treatment and the decedent's difficulties was a report dated
January 25, 196.5 and received by the Industrial Commission on 1\'Iarch 25, 1965 ( R. 25) . The applicant,
l\'.Ir. Sterling C. McWilliams, informed the Industrial
Commission that he was being treated by Dr. Evans on
.January 14, 1965, in which he made a request to the
Industrial Commission that he be allowed permission to
seek the services of a chiropractor (R. 21).
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff's basis for alleging an estoppel is based upon factual considerations that
are not accurate. In the first place, the defendant did
r~ot authorize and afford compensation for treatment
fur heart disease; secondly, there is no evidence that the
(kfendant ha.cl any knowledge of the difficulties of the
applicant in regard to cardiac disease until subsequent
to the Commission's order of December 17, 1964.

The Commission's order of December 17th. HHH
did not make a determination that Sterling Mc,Yil-
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Hams' incapacity was caused by the injury of July :2:2,
1964. The order of the Commission was that the defendant pay all medical and hospital bills incurred as a
result of the accidental injury ( R. 19). At the time the
order was entered by the Commission the only knmdedge of injuries was the claim for compensation based
upon a basal skull fracture. On February 25th the
applicant was examined by Dr. Viko (R. 34). Dr.
Yiko, sensing an emergency, contacted Dr. Evans and
the defendant was admitted immediately to the hospital
because of the emergency situation.
The plaintiff cites as authority 100 C.J .S. §657'.
This encyclopedia, however, in regard to the issue of
res judicata sets forth generally two classification:;
where matters are held to be res judicata and where
matters are held not to be res judicata. The text states
that matters are res judicata as to facts on which jurisdiction depends, i.e., employment of the employee, the
relationship between the parties, etc. ( 100 C.J.S. §657,
p. 991). It is stated, however, on page 992 that under
the circumstances of this case the order of December 17,
1964 was not res judicata:
"ft! atters held not res iudicatn. Under a statute authorizing a reYision because of change of
condition, an award is not a final adjudication
as to the degree of injury sustained."

It should be pointed out that Utah has such a statute.
See 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which proYicles
in essence that the power and jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission is a continuing one and the C01;1-
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m1ss1011 has authority to make such modification or
changes as in its opinion may be justified. The Utah
cases construing this statute have articulated the right
of the Industrial Commission to modify a decree when
there has been a change of circumstances. See Salt
Lake City v. 11he Industrial Cummissio·n, 61 Utah 5H
251 Pac. 1047; Carter v. The Industrial Commission
'
76 Utah 520, 290 P. 2d 776. Our court has also spoken
to the issue of res judicata and has held that the doctrine of res judicata which is applicable in a court
proceeding is not in the strict sense applicable to proceedings before an Industrial Commission, Spencer v.
Industrial Commission, 4 Utah 2d 185, 290 P. 2d 692.
)

100 C.J.S., §657, 993, sets forth the applicable law
in cases of this kind when it states as follows:
"VVhere an injured employee files a claim for
an injury and the Commission is not advised that
he had i:;eceived a second injury and the hearing
is limited solely to the first injury, the order of
the Commission goes only to the first injury and
thereafter the Commission may hear and determine claimant's right to compensation for the
second injury . . . In order for the doctrine of
res judicata to apply, the subject matter of the
second proceeding must be the same; and so, althoLtgh a view to the contrary has been taken, it
has been held that a wife applying for compensation for the death of her son is not bound by
findings in her prior proceedings for compensation for the death of her h~lSband in the same
accident that she was wholly dependent on the
husband, which findings were based on the statutory presumption to that effect." Citing Utah
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Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 67 Utah 25, 245 Pac. 381.
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lt is defendant's position, therefore, that the order
of December 17, 1964 did not speak to the issue of
whether or not the basal skull fracture caused the cardiac problem; secondly, that the Commission's order
specifically limited its award to injuries caused by the
accident; further, that the doctrine of res judicata is
not applicable in the State of Utah in matters of this
kind (See 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and the
cases construing the same) . Even if the doctrine of res
judicata would be applicable, the applicant in this case
cannot rely on this doctrine because she was a different
party than the applicant in the original proceedings.

It is defendants' position that the two Utah cases
in regards to this matter, that is Taggart v. Industrial
Commission, 79 Utah 598, 12 P. 2d 356, and Harding
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 83 Utah 376 28 P.2d
182, clearly show that the defendant is not estopped in
this case. In the Taggart case, supra, the issue presented
was whether or not the hemorrhage to an ulcer in the
right nostril was due to an accident or was a disease unrelated to compensation coverage. In that case it appeared that the surety had paid compensation for temporary total disability for a period from August 11th to
Sepetmber 9th. The applicant claimed that the surety
was, therefore, es topped from denying liability for the
death. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this theory
and held that the employer's insurance carrier's payment of compensation did not preclude it from denying
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that the employee met with au accident causing death.
Citing Halling v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 11:.:l,
263 Pac. 78.
The Harding case mentioned above clearly presents the proper rule as set forth in appellants' brief on
page 39. The court found estoppel in that case. However, medical care had been furnished for over five
years and, in fact, by making such payment the lapse
of time was so great that the statute of limitations may
have been successfully urged against any such action
and as such the court found actual prejudice.

lt is clear that the defendants are not estoppe<l
from denying liability in this matter since at the initial
hearing no knowledge was had as to a cardiac problem;
secondly, no treatment was paid for or authorized by
the surety, and, the apylicant was not misled nor prejudiced and thus the defendant is not estopped from
denying liability.
CONCLUSION
The actions of the Industrial Commission iu this
case cannot be said to be arbitrary and capricious an<l
as such the Commission's ruling should be sustained
by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. _LVIOORE
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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